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I.  Introduction  
-How these low hollow coral islands bear no proportion to the vast ocean out of 
which they abruptly rise; and it seems wonderful that such weak invaders are not 
overwhelmed, by the all-powerful and never-tiring waves of that great sea. 
-Charles Darwin, commenting the tiny coral atoll islands1 
-Oceanic states composed of atolls . . . face severe consequences as a result of sea 
level rise.  They can be wiped of the globe literally if the sea levels continue to 
rise at their current rates. 
-Research team of meteorological scientists2 
Global warming:  Myth or Reality?  Depending on whether the current temperature is hot 
or cold, each person will have a different opinion3 and despite the plethora of evidence literally 
pouring in on the effects of global warming, the debate continues.4  Unfortunately, if you speak 
to many Pacific Islanders, such as those living in Tuvalu located about half way between 
Australia and Hawaii, there is no debate: the ravaging effects of global warming can be seen 
even today and these effects are devastating an entire country and a way of life.5  The tiny nation 
of Tuvalu emits only a miniscule amount of deadly greenhouse gases (GHGs) that yield climate 
change, yet they are in a state of crisis specifically because of these GHGs.  Many if not all 
Tuvaluan’s fear their homes will soon be either underwater or washed away as a result of the 
global warming phenomenon.  The nation itself has even made plans for their citizens to become 
environmental refugees in New Zealand because of either current sea level rise or their fear of 
the inevitable.6  Yet despite these tumultuous times, situated roughly five thousand miles away, 
lies a gluttonous giant producing roughly 23% of the annual global GHG emissions while only 
representing 5% of the global population: the United States and there appears to be no end in 
sight.7  While the United States government attempts to downplay the effects of global warming 
for fear that abatement will result in economic downturn and less air conditioning, little to no 
action is taken in reducing these excessive country-wide GHG emissions.8  While this glutton 
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continues without end, however, the phenomenon of global warming is beginning a trend toward 
complete devastation of Pacific Island Nations with affects ranging from increased sea level 
flooding, a lack of fresh water supply, increased frequency and magnitude of storms, to 
ultimately an uninhabitable homeland.   
 When one realizes the state of fear that exists for these nations it is only natural to search 
for any kind of remedy for their suffering.  For these nations who will not only be the first if not 
the hardest hit by climate change, there must be justice.  Nations, including the United States, 
which continue to destroy the planet without regard to consequence must be held liable by any 
means available so as to end the cycle that is turning pristine and exotic nations such as Tuvalu 
into proverbial guinea pigs whose untimely fate will likely be the fate of the world.  As such, this 
thesis will first brush the surface of the most recent scientific data on climate change while 
elaborating on the already evident affects global warming is having on Pacific Island Nations.  
For sake of clarity, Tuvalu will be the focus.  A discussion on possible jurisdictional strategies 
for bringing the United States to atone for their actions will follow as will a practical application 
of international laws and standards that will likely be applied to the case if jurisdiction can be 
found.  The final question and focus is whether court action would, in theory, prove 
advantageous to the islands, what pitfalls they may encounter, and what remedies would be 
available to Tuvalu in this hypothetical lawsuit. 
II. Current State of the Environment: The Science  
A. Statistics and Research 
1. Overview 
 
The focus of this thesis on state responsibility and global warming must, necessarily, 
include a discussion of recent scientific data on the subject.  However, an in depth scientific 
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discussion is beyond its scope.  The problem lies in finding an exact scientific basis for global 
warming as, depending on which special interest group one receives their information from, 
discussions of “science” will differ.  Fortunately, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), a group established by the World Meteorological Organization and the United 
Nations Environment Programme, was established specifically for the task of objectively and 
neutrally assessing the scientific and technical information related to anthropogenic climate 
change, its potential impacts, and options for mitigation.9  Specifically, the IPCC collects and 
reviews scientific, peer reviewed data and compiles it for the public after first being reviewed by 
experts and governments.10   Recently, the IPCC has released its Fourth Assessment Report and 
although the complete report has yet to be published, several summary reports are available for 
review.11  In particular, the IPCC has published the Working Group I report on the Physical 
Science Basis of Climate Change.12  The conclusion of this report establishes that the 
“[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of 
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and 
rising global average sea level.”13  This observed warming trend, according to the report, is “very 
likely [around 90%] due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations.”14  As such, there are stark predictions for the future of the globe with the first 
victim being Tuvalu and those nations similarly situated.  Granted, science cannot see clearly 
into the future and Mother Nature always has a way of throwing a wrench into predictions.  
However, given the already visible ramifications of global warming and the international 
standard that scientific uncertainty is not a justification for inactivity, significant measures must 
be taken to counteract the phenomenon already set in motion.   
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2. Evidence of Global Warming 
Unfortunately, the phrase “global warming” is not a misnomer.  It is a fact that eleven of 
the last twelve years rank among the twelve warmest years on record15 and the linear warming 
trend for the last 50 years has nearly doubled when compared to the trend in the last 100 years.16  
For those skeptics that argue that global warming is a myth, it is true that the average earth’s 
temperature has not increased over one degree (1º) in recorded history.  However, this 
information, does not account for all variables.  With the data available, the Earth’s “[t]he total 
temperature increase” is 0.76ºC by looking at the years 1850-1899 to 2001-2005.17  However, 
this data also shows the ocean has kept these numbers low as it “has been absorbing more than 
80% of the heat added to the climate system.”18  Not only does this warming of the oceans have 
an impact on the marine ecosystem, but also causes seawater to increase in volume or expand. 19   
While humans may not detect the average temperature increasing at exponential rates, for coral 
atoll nations such as Tuvalu, sea water expansion, effectuating sea level rise, is catastrophic.20  In 
fact, the years 1961 to 2003 have seen an average global sea level rise at a rate of 1.8 millimeters 
(mm) per year.21  This average rate, however, drastically increased in the last decade to around 
3.1 mm per year.22  Adding insult to literal injury, with the increasing temperatures comes 
melting of mountain glaciers and snow cover which also increases the actual amount of water in 
the oceans.23  Proving that all things in nature are related, this rise in sea level impacts the water 
levels associated with storm waves and surges, increasing them as well.24    
3. Current Evidence, Predictions, and Simulations  
 
Further evidence of global warming exists as well including increased incidence of 
droughts, significant coral bleaching, increasing intensity of hurricanes, greater frequency of 
mosquito-borne diseases, increasing salinity of soils due to higher sea levels impacting 
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cultivation of crops, increased coastal erosion, melting of polar ice caps and rising sea levels. 25  
Though many larger and wealthy countries may not be as impacted by these consequences, in 
Tuvalu, where physical space is scarce, adaptation by retreat to higher ground or using building 
set-backs will have little practical utility.26  
So what does the future hold?  During the IPCC study, simulations were conducted to 
“provide a quantitative basis” as to the likelihood and impacts of future climate change.27  The 
following IPCC projections are staggering: 
• Warming of around 0.2ºC per decade for the next two decades; 
• Increasing acidification of the ocean; 
• Arctic and Antarctic sea ice shrinking resulting, in some scenarios, to Arctic late-
summer sea ice disappearing before the end of the 21st century; 
• Hurricanes and tropical cyclones increasing in intensity while heat waves 
continue to become more frequent; 
• Because of the time necessary to remove anthropogenic carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere, warming and sea level rise will continue for more than a millennia;28 
• In less than a century, the global seas will rise an average of 9-88 centimeters.29 
 
Unfortunately, despite these projections, no action as been taken and the concentrations 
of GHGs are not subsiding.  In 2005, the United States Energy Information Administration 
estimated that the United States produced 7,100 million metric tons of carbon dioxide.30  Point of 
fact, since the industrial revolution, where no precautions were existent, the carbon dioxide 
concentration in the atmosphere has rose from 280 parts per million (ppm) to around 380 ppm.31  
If current gluttonous trends continue, predictions state that by 2100, the concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere will have risen to about 800 ppm.32  Given current knowledge of 
climate change ramifications, these predictions are appalling, unacceptable, and will be 
devastating first and foremost to nations such as Tuvalu. 
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B. Who is to be affected first: Consequences of Inaction  
If one has ever lived through a flood, they are well aware of the destruction caused: the 
water invading a home, rotting and washing away valuable and priceless possessions.  While the 
citizens of the United States may only fear flooding on occasion, imagine this encroaching 
destruction as a part of regular yearly life.  The fear of permanent flooding can be so violative 
that even one who has resided in their home for decades and whose heritage lies within a small 
nation can be forced to relocate and abandon everything they have known their entire life.  
Regrettably, those perpetrators of this destruction are continually turning a blind eye to the 
damage and refuse abatement for the sake of comfort.  Flooding by sea level rise is one of the 
catastrophic consequences of global warming that is already encroaching upon many nations.  
Inlanders have nothing to fear, but what if there is no higher ground to reach?   
1. Tuvalu 
-We live in constant fear of the adverse impacts of climate change. For a coral 
atoll nation, sea level rise and more severe weather events loom as a growing 
threat to our entire population. The threat is real and serious, and is of no 
difference to a slow and insidious form of terrorism against us. 
- Saufatu Sopoanga, Prime Minister of Tuvalu33 
This fourth smallest country in the world based on land area34 consists of nine (9) coral 
atolls in the South Pacific Ocean.35  Simply put, atolls are “rings of coral reefs enclosing a 
lagoon.  Around the rim of the reef are small islands, usually with average heights above sea 
level of only a few meters.”36  The highest elevation of Tuvalu, and the main justification as to 
why it is inhabitants are in constant fear of global warming and resultant rising sea levels, is only 
a mere five (5) meters above sea level.37  Given its small size, only around ten (10) square miles, 
sea level rise and storm surges pose catastrophic perils for the island’s 10,000 inhabitants.38  
Within the last ten years, Australia’s National Tidal Center (NTC) has recorded a yearly 4.5 mm 
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rise on the banks of Tuvalu.39  “Extreme sea level, storm surges and high wave energy events . . . 
increasingly lead to wave overtopping and flooding of atolls and low-lying coastal fringes [such 
as Tuvalu], [which] threaten[s] lives, infrastructure and property.”40  Inhabitants of Tuvalu have 
accounted that, recently within the last several years “during high tides, . . .water comes right 
across the ground” and into Tuvaluan houses.41  The Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Pooni Laupepa, has also commented that the storms Tuvalu experiences are getting worse and 
more frequent.42  Furthermore, sea level rise lends itself to increased salinity of groundwater.43  
Such a result is devastating, “especially on atolls where groundwater is often the only source of 
freshwater for human consumption and agriculture.”44  Increased salinity has already forced 
Tuvaluan families “to grow their root crops in metal buckets instead of in the ground”45 and 
“damage to coral reefs from more frequent and intense coral bleaching and wave damage[], . . 
.[will ultimately lead] to loss of wave protection, [and] loss of fisheries.”46  Heat is another factor 
in this equation as “rising sea temperatures associated with El Nino in 1998 bleached corals 
around the world from here to the Great Barrier Reed off Australia.”47  The frequency and drastic 
affects of climate change to Tuvalu are astonishing.  “[H]igh tides and resultant floods that used 
to visit Tuvalu in February are occurring nearly half the year, from November to March.”48  And 
as for storms, “whereas in the past big cyclones rampaged through these islands only once or 
twice a decade . . . the 1990s saw [seven] 7 of them.”49 
 The fact that these nations appear to be sitting ducks in the middle of a raging storm is 
horrifying.  However, given that “Small Island States are not major contributors to the total 
emission of greenhouse gases,” the fact that they may be “severely affected by consequent sea-
level rise and climate change” is simply unjust.50  To add insult to serious injury, in most cases 
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these islands have limited resources and, therefore, are “less able to adapt to climate change than 
other states, unless they receive foreign aid to do so.”51 
 What can Tuvalu possibly do to change their fate?  Domestic action clearly cannot occur 
as larger, more powerful and influential nations are the direct cause of their injury.  Pleas for 
assistance are seemingly inaudible to these nations as evidenced by slothful inaction to a 
desperate situation.  What appears the only course of action for the inhabitants and the nation as 
a whole is to hold the United States and other major carbon dioxide emitters liable for their 
failure to take necessary steps to cease the eventual eradication of a heritage, of a people, of an 
entire nation. 
III. Jurisdiction:  Possibilities for Global Jurisprudence 
To delve into the global jurisprudential ramifications of Tuvalu bringing any action 
against the United States, it is first necessary to determine which venues would have jurisdiction 
over the parties as well as the subject matter in such a case.  Given that seeking a “remedy” 
against the United States may be an ambitious goal, this paper will also focus on venues for 
Tuvalu to bring the United States to the bargaining table with the goal of forcing United States 
actions to international spotlight.  This is a major hurdle for any nation or entity seeking remedy 
though international means much less the fourth smallest nations in the world battling a 
superpower.  Steps must be taken, however, and as such this section will begin discussion on the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and then delve into several treaties that may allow Tuvalu to 
bring the United States into arbitration.   
A. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
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The most logical starting point for a discussion on international jurisprudence is clearly 
the ICJ.  Given the history of the court, “[i]t would likely be the most politically visible and 
authoritative adjudicatory forum.”52  Tuvalu previously proposed such action against the United 
States within the ICJ in 2002 while seeking collaboration with other small island nations.53  To 
date, no information is available regarding such a suit.54  Regardless, if Tuvalu were to follow 
through, there are two (2) ways for the ICJ to obtain jurisdiction over subject matter or a state:  
contentious jurisdiction or advisory opinions.55  Each of these will be taken in turn.   
1. Contentious Jurisdiction 
 
Simply put, the ICJ, acting as a world court, decides international disputes between states 
that are submitted to it.56  Within contentious jurisdiction, and as set forth in Article 35 of the ICJ 
Statute, any state that is a party to the Statute can bring a claim in the ICJ against another state.57  
However, “[i]n accordance with the principle of state sovereignty [the largest hindrance to any 
international action], jurisdiction by the Court over a defendant state must ultimately be based 
upon the consent of that state.”58  If jurisdiction is consented to by a state, then the court has the 
authority to hear legal disputes regarding “the interpretation of a treaty, questions of international 
law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation, and the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation.”59  As such, two issues need to be resolved: Whether the aforementioned discussion 
on liability for global warming would fall within ICJ contentious jurisdiction and secondly, 
whether the United States would consent to this jurisdiction.  First, and as will be elaborated on 
below, Tuvalu could successfully argue ICJ jurisdiction over the subject matter of potential suit 
given international obligations arising out of the theory of state responsibility or even under 
certain treaties of which the United States and Tuvalu are parties.  Whether the United States 
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breached its international obligation of environmental protection as discussed in the Restatement 
(though not binding in and of itself) could also be brought before the court.   The essential 
problem lies, however, in the second inquiry of consent.  Point of fact, and as established in the 
ICJ Statute, no state can be a party to proceedings before the ICJ unless it has consented to ICJ 
jurisdiction.60  Practically speaking, such consent on the part of the United States will not be 
forthcoming.  The United States has failed to consent to ICJ jurisdiction in other cases brought 
against it and will likely reject jurisdiction in this case given any potentially unfavorable 
outcome.61  
2. Advisory Opinion 
 
Article 65 of the ICJ Statute may provide another venue for elaboration of international 
obligations in the global warming context as it does not require asserting jurisdiction over the 
United States per se.62  Under this Article, the ICJ may give an advisory opinion on any question 
of law to any body authorized under the United Nations Charter (Charter) to request such an 
opinion.63   Under the Charter, such bodies include the United Nations General Assembly, the 
Security Council, or any United Nations specialized agency that both receives authorization from 
the General Assembly and whose scope of activities revolves around the particular legal issue in 
question.64  Given the United States permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and, 
therefore, permanent veto ability, the only way an opinion on Tuvalu’s legal issues would be 
requested of the ICJ is if the General Assembly either requests such legal opinion or authorized 
another United Nations specialized agency to request such legal opinion.65   
Several initial determinations must be made however.  Under Article 18 of the Charter, 
the General Assembly must have a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting to 
decide “important” questions.66   These important questions generally revolve around 
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maintaining international peace and security or election of Security Council non-permanent 
members.67  It is questionable whether requesting an ICJ advisory opinion on a legal issue 
requires such a two-thirds vote as the ICJ has previously agreed to render an advisory opinion 
dealing with nuclear weapons with less than two-thirds of the General Assembly voting in 
favor.68   The main problem lies, therefore, in obtaining such a General Assembly vote less than 
a two-thirds majority.69  Given both the controversial nature of such a case and the many 
countries that are a part of the General Assembly that are GHG producing nations in and of 
themselves, a favorable vote might depend “on how narrowly the question presented to the ICJ 
could be framed.”70  “These countries might well be reluctant to charge the ICJ with coming to a 
determination that could implicate the legality of their own emissions.”71    
Other United Nations specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization 
(WHO) or even the Food and Agricultural Organization could attempt to bring these legal 
questions before the ICJ wherein the General Assembly would not require a two-thirds vote.72  
However, given past ICJ decisions regarding the competency of these specialized agencies to 
seek an advisory opinion, such attempts by these bodies may not be likely.73  In any event, even 
if the General Assembly or appropriate United Nations specialized agency brought the legal 
question of global warming and international obligations to stop the phenomenon before the ICJ, 
advisory opinion jurisdiction would not allow Tuvalu to bring a suit directly nor would the 
decision directly implicate or bind the United States.  Advantages to an advisory opinion do 
exist, however.  Clarification of the legal issues present and as set forth below, could give Tuvalu 
that much more leverage against the United States when seeking a remedy for contributing to the 
global warming phenomenon and, in fact, may be a good starting point.    
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B. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
 
Another straightforward option may exist for Tuvalu to bring the United States to the 
bargaining table, though hope for success is again minimal.  The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Convention), of which both Tuvalu and the United 
States are parties, has created a dispute resolution framework applicable to states parties to the 
UNFCCC.74  Article 14(5) of the Convention provides for a mandatory dispute resolution 
mechanism should negotiation between parties in a dispute under the Convention not settle the 
dispute, namely conciliation.75  Should one of the parties so request, a conciliation commission 
will be created and composed of “an equal number of members appointed by each party 
concerned and a chairman chosen jointly by the members appointed by each party.”76  This 
commission shall then “render a recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good 
faith.”77 The usage of the phrase “good faith” could easily dishearten a nation hoping to find 
accountability for destruction of their nation, but, given the generally nonbinding nature of 
international jurisprudence, a conciliation commission may be a venue to bring the parties to the 
same table and bring international attention to Tuvalu’s plight.  Yet, a fundamental problem lies 
with this option as well.  The Convention provides that the Conference of the Parties adopt 
conciliation procedures as soon as practicable; this has not yet occurred.78  Perhaps if these 
conciliation procedures materialize, it may prove a viable option for Tuvalu.  “While 
proceedings before the conciliation commission would have a much lower profile than those 
before the ICJ, and its determination would not be binding, a conciliation case might be able to 
help establish that the United States is not complying with its obligations under the UNFCCC.”79  
Such obligations include both nonbinding GHG emission targets and assisting “developing 
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country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in 
meeting the costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.”80  
C. Law of the Sea:  Straddling Fish Stocks 
 
Another, perhaps more promising, avenue Tuvalu can explore is provided for under the 
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement under the Convention of the Law of the Sea (Straddling Fish 
Stocks Agreement).81  The Law of the Sea Convention has a system of binding dispute resolution 
within its texts.82  Though the United States is not a signatory to the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea,83 it is a party to the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement which “provides that disputes 
arising under it be settled through the Law of the Sea’s Dispute Settlement Provisions.”84  Under 
these dispute settlement provisions, if a state does not chose by written declaration a means for 
settlement of disputes, and unless the parties to a dispute agree otherwise, then the parties to the 
dispute can only be sent to arbitration.85    Procedures for arbitration are set forth in Annex VII to 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea and not only mandate finality of an award but also 
mandate the binding nature of the arbitration to both of the parties.86  In the best case scenario, 
Tuvalu, though first having to agree to the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, would be able to 
arbitrate these global warming issues and have the United States bound to the arbitrators’ 
decision.  The problem, of course, is that by its very nature, the Straddling Fish Stocks 
Agreement is not intended to cover the global warming phenomenon.  This does not leave 
Tuvalu stranded however.  A novel argument can be made that given the science of global 
warming and its effects on the seas and fisheries, and given that the Straddling Fish Stocks 
Agreement is intended to protect certain species of fish, any dispute between Tuvalu and the 
United States over the impact of global warming endangering fish stocks must be brought to 
binding arbitration as intended in the Agreement.87  
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Again, though not as public as a suit within the ICJ, such binding arbitration may 
constitute a wake up call to the United States or other GHG producing nations.  It can further 
wake up the world to the plight of Tuvalu and other Pacific Island Nations in desperate peril as a 
result of global warming. 
IV. Laws and International Treaties and their Applicability to the United States 
Regardless of whether an international venue for suit can be found, it is necessary to 
understand the international laws and obligations that impact any discussion on global warming.  
Fortunately, there is an excessive amount of material within international jurisprudence on 
transboundary pollution.  This material, however, is generally considered soft international law, 
and as such, is not considered formally binding even if a proper forum for adjudication can be 
found.88  “Ultimately the principle behind holding countries liable for transboundary pollution is 
drawn from on of the most basic precepts of all legal systems, that legal actors should be 
responsible for the harm they do to others.”89  Generally, this theory is known as state 
responsibility.  The concept of state responsibility with regard to environmental degradation has 
two main functions.90  First, to compliment existing law and help enforce the prevention of 
environmental harm as is obligated by such international law.91   Second, to provide injured 
states, individuals, and the environment with redress in the form of compensation for such harm 
and abatement of future harm.92  This section will focus on these international laws of state 
responsibility which an international tribunal will likely apply if suit is brought.  The outline of 
the discussion will revolve around §601 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (Restatement §601) and its applicability to transboundary pollution, international 
environmental harm, global warming, and Tuvalu.  Section IV: Practical Application will 
analyze the specific rules and its relation to the case at bar.  It is first important to note, however,  
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that though not binding in and of itself, the Restatement is looked upon as persuasive authority.  
As such, it is a good indicator as to what courts may look at or decide when approaching the 
legal question of state responsibility for global warming.  For purposes of this discussion, it is a 
good indicator as to what international obligations the United States may be violating. 
A. Overview:  Restatement of Foreign Relations of the U.S. §601-§602 
Because the global environment, such as the air we breath and the oceans of the world, is 
not simply a resource belonging to one particular nation, consideration must necessarily be given 
to those affected outside the boundaries of the state where the pollution may be originating.  
Restatement §601 relating to State Obligations with Respect to the Environment embodies this 
notion.  The rule specifically states:  
 A state is obligated to take such measures as may be 
necessary, to the extent practicable under the circumstances, to 
ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control  (a) conform 
to generally accepted international rules and standards for the 
prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of 
another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; 
and (b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the 
environment of another state or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.93 
 
 Simply put, a state is obligated to take necessary measures to make sure its actions 
comply with international law and do not cause injury to others. For the sake of clarity, 
Restatement §601 can be broken down into its three (3) elements to determine liability.  First, 
there must be an activity within the state’s jurisdiction or control.94  Second, there must be a 
breach of international rules and standards.  Finally, there must be significant injury to the 
aggrieved party.  Each of these elements will be considered in turn.     
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1. Activity within the Jurisdiction or Control  
When determining whether a state, in this case the United States, can be held liable for 
destruction to the environment of another state, for example, by transboundary GHG emissions 
and the resultant climate change,  the activity does not necessarily have to be on the part of the 
state itself.  Rather the activity, as it occurs within the United States, can be a direct result of a 
private entity acting within the state or within the state’s jurisdiction.  Comments to Restatement 
§601 are instructive and specifically express that a state is responsible for not only its own 
activities but also “those of individuals or private or public corporations under its jurisdiction.”95  
In addition to this, inaction may even result in liability.  For example, a state can be held liable 
for not promulgating and enacting important necessary legislation to cease the environmentally 
damaging activity occurring within the state.96  The state can also be responsible for “not 
preventing or terminating an illegal activity, or for not punishing the person responsible for it.”97  
Though, on its face, this rule seems fairly straightforward, the issue of responsibility and, to take 
it another step, liability, may be difficult in transboundary pollution cases as there is no single, 
isolated activity that is the ultimate cause of destruction.98  Neither is the perpetrating state the 
only culprit as in the case at hand, nearly three-quarters (¾) of the harmful emissions are 
products of other nations including, and even though exceptionally minimal, the injured state.99  
This apportionment of responsibility could play a role in either determining liability in and of 
itself, but, more likely, in determining allocation of damages.  In either event, such an argument 
could be made by Tuvalu in a potential suit against the United States with the ultimate 
determination on the issue being made by a tribunal. 
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2. Conforming to International Rules and Standards 
The second aspect of state responsibility is the mandate that the United States conform to 
international rules and standards.  Generally, this means that the United States is bound to follow 
both the accepted rules of customary international law and those rules that are proscribed by 
international conventions.100  If a specific international rule, such as a treaty between the 
offender nation and the aggrieved nation, is violated, any state can object to the violation.101  If a 
state is injured as a result of the violation of an international rule, then the injured party is 
entitled to damages or other relief from the offending nation.102 More importantly, if there is a 
threat of injury to another state, the threatened state or a state acting on its behalf, “is entitled to 
have the dangerous activity terminated.”103  The discussion of remedies will ensue in Section VI 
of this thesis but with this in mind, it is necessary to delve into several international rules and 
standards that are relevant to Tuvalu’s current situation.    
a) Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
The first of such rules is Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.   Principle 21 
pronounces that states have the “responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.”104  The Stockholm Declaration in and of itself, though essential to any 
international environmental law discussion, is not considered binding international law.105  
Principle 21, on the other hand, has become so entwined and generally accepted in the 
international arena that it was declared by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) nearly a decade 
ago to be customary international law.106  It remains today “an important statement of customary 
international environmental law,” and therefore, binding on all nations.107   
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b) The Precautionary Principle and Shifting the Burden of Proof 
Another of these international rules and standards applicable to the United States is the 
Precautionary Principle as set forth in the 1992 Rio Declaration on the Environment and 
Development (Rio Declaration).  The precautionary principle developed as national and 
international reaction to large threats affecting multiple nations, such as the threat of global 
warming, was simply not reactive enough for human kind protection.108  This principle embodies 
the notion that scientific uncertainty is not a release of liability for failure to prevent international 
environmental harm.109  As set forth in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, the precautionary 
principle states:   
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.110 
 
 As such, when a threat of harm to the environment arises, preventative measures must be 
taken even if the “cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.”111  As 
with most environmental issues, complex science is involved to determine the cause and effect 
relationship of certain activities.112   The precautionary principle simply “addresses how 
environmental decisions are made in the face of scientific uncertainty.”113  Such a principle is 
indispensable to a discussion on global warming as many nations dismiss their obligations to the 
environment by hiding under the cloak of uncertainty and unpredictability.  Significantly, 
commentators on this subject argue that this principle not only imposes an obligation in the face 
of uncertainty but also has the effect of shifting the burden of proof from those who seek relief to 
those who wish to continue the destructive activity.114  Also fundamental to the precautionary 
principle is the direct relationship that exists between the level of action a state must take and the 
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extent of possible extraterritorial harm that may occur.115  This principle has become engrained 
in any international discourse on the environment and though not binding per se, over fifteen 
(15) years ago it was stated that the precautionary principle was rapidly being accepted within 
international forums: 
  The speed with which the precautionary principle has been brought on to the 
international agenda, and the range and variety of international forums which 
have explicitly accepted it within the recent past, are quite staggering.  There is no 
question but that it is now the most important new policy approach in 
international environmental co-operation.116 
 
 With the international importance and wide acceptance of this principle, though 
not specifically stated as customary international law to date, it appears only a matter of 
time before it is accepted as such and, therefore, would likely play a significant role in 
any action Tuvalu may take against the United States. 
3. Significant Injury 
The final element of significant injury to the violated nation is a seemingly amorphous 
topic in which one has no direct precedent to rely on.117  No specific definition can be 
extrapolated from this rule.118  However, “references to ‘significant’ impact on the environment 
are common in both international law and United States law.”119  Clearly, the term ‘significant’ 
bars cases of only minimal damage and the exact level of what constitutes significant injury will 
ultimately be a judicial decision.120  It will be likely that this judicial decision will balance the 
injury caused to a state against the essential nature of the activity causing the damage to the 
perpetrator state. 121 
B. Human Rights Law 
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Though not necessarily straightforward in application or in judicial response, given the 
profound impact on the lives of the people in Tuvalu, it is natural that a discussion of human 
rights law should be touched upon as applicable to this situation.122  Depending on the 
jurisdiction or dispute resolution venue Tuvalu chooses, there are two (2) specific human rights 
laws that are most applicable to the situation: the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.123  Under each 
of these Covenants, given the straightforward nature of the rights specified within them, other 
than application to Tuvalu, not much explanation is required.  However, basic human rights laws 
and their applicability to environmental harms and as a way to seek justice for injury and damage 
is really not at all clear and has, in fact, had mixed success within international forums.124  
Regardless, given the natural convergence between human lives and the global environment, a 
sound argument can be made that with any environmental degradation, the most basic human 
rights can be violated. 
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a binding agreement that the 
United States has both signed and ratified.125  Given the nature and clear infringement of these 
rights and occurs with the environmental degradation specifically in the case of Tuvalu, 
application of the ICCPR seems fairly unambiguous.  Within the ICCPR is embodied the 
following immutable rights specifically relevant to the topic of environmental degradation of a 
nation as a result of global warming:  the inherent right to life for every human being,126 the right 
to liberty and security of person,127 the right to liberty of movement and freedom to chose one’s 
own residence,128 and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with their home.129   
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2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
Unlike the ICCPR, the United States is only a signatory to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.130  As such, though not specifically bound by its terms, 
the United States is obligated to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of 
the treaty.131  Throughout the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, 
the following rights as applicable to this situation are set forth:  the right to work,132 the right to 
adequate standards of living including adequate food and housing,133 the right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental heath,134 and the right to take part in cultural life.135 
V. Tuvalu and Application of the Law:  
A. Restatement §601, Principle 21, and the Precautionary Principle 
Each of these above stated rules, even when read alone, appear to hold some promise for 
Pacific Island Nations and Tuvalu.  As such, it is necessary to apply each of these obligations to 
the situation at hand to determine whether, ultimately, the United States could be held liable for 
its environmental damage, inaction, and intentional blindness to its violative activity.    
1. Activity within the Jurisdiction or Control 
The first discussion of our application is fairly straightforward and as such needs little 
discussion.  As stated previously, the United States is responsible for 23% of greenhouse gas 
emissions while only representing 5% of the population.136  This substantial release of toxins 
solely occurs within the United States jurisdiction and control.  Whether it be caused by the 
United States government directly is not relevant.137  Private or even public corporations within 
United States jurisdiction that continue to release emissions will ultimately impart liability on the 
United States for harm to other nations.138  Even more significant in this case, is that a state can 
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be held liable for not enacting necessary legislation to prevent harm.139  In this regard, it is 
probative that not only has the United States failed to take important international action by 
failing to ratify target agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, it has also been outspoken as to its 
contempt for such agreements citing unjust penalties to the United States and lack of 
requirements for developing nations.140  Granted, the United States could defend its actions 
based on international agreements such as the UNFCCC as proof of achievement in the area of 
climate change, however this non-binding Convention that only obligates countries to aim for 
better emission standards can hardly constitute the preventative action that would be necessary 
here.141  Furthermore, allegations that the Bush Administration has pressured scientists to 
downplay and mislead the public when discussing global warming can hardly make United 
States actions seem forthright and honest.142  In the face of ever increasing scientific data 
regarding not only the human element of global warming but also the progressively dismal 
calculations as to global warming effects, failure to take this data into account and implement 
new legislation to reduce GHG emissions must be seen as negligent at its best and criminal at its 
worst.    
2. Conforming to International Rules and Standards 
Whether or not the United States has conformed to the rules and standards of the 
international arena is the next question to be asked.  The application of Principle 21 to Tuvalu 
makes a fairly clear case.  One important caveat to this rule is that the obligation of responsibility 
for activities causing damages to the environment of other states is no where near strict liability 
and foreseeability of harm is necessary before liability can attach.143   However, in this case, 
strict liability is unnecessary.  Given the exceptional scientific advancements over the years, and 
with the plethora of scientific data that exists as to the causes and affects of global warming 
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coupled with the necessity of precaution, harm as a result of anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
emission is now clearly foreseeable.  As one scientist stated several years ago: 
The overwhelming majority of scientific experts, whilst recognizing that scientific 
uncertainties exist, nonetheless believe that human-induced climate change is 
inevitable. Indeed, during the last few years, many parts of the world have 
suffered major heat waves, floods, droughts, fires and extreme weather events 
leading to significant economic losses and loss of life. While individual events 
cannot be directly linked to human-induced climate change, the frequency and 
magnitude of these types of events are predicted to increase in a warmer world.144 
 
From the language of Principle 21 as well as the Restatement, a direct link between 
specific events, such as an individual drought or storm that cannot be extrapolated from specific 
anthropogenic GHG emission is not necessary.  Given the majority of scientists linking global 
warming to climate change and the predictions of devastation as a result, the element of 
foreseeability is fulfilled.  It has become clear that “[t]he question is not whether climate will 
change in response to human activities, but rather how much . . .how fast . . and where.”145   
Knowing, as we do, that greenhouse gas emissions are causing rapid changes in the 
environment, Principle 21 mandates an international obligation to not only cease the activity 
causing foreseeable future harm, but also to implement necessary domestic legislation to curtail 
these emissions.  As such, the world’s largest producer of GHGs tipping the scales at roughly 
one-quarter (¼) of the emissions produced is bound by this obligation.146  Yet, the United States 
is blatantly failing to do so.  Concededly, some domestic legislation to curtail emissions has been 
implemented within the United States and has, in fact, made an impact on the global 
environment.   Yet it appears fairly certain with not only bleak predictions but also the certainty 
with which many scientists speak as to the effects of anthropogenic global warming that the 
interpretation of “necessary legislation” must take on a different and more stringent meaning.  
By failing to promulgate new, more rigorous, legislation and by failing to implement target 
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agreements such as Kyoto, the United States has necessarily failed in their responsibility and 
obligation not to harm the environment of other nations. 
The precautionary principle, that absolute science is not a defense for inaction, when read 
in conjunction with Principle 21 only further solidifies the above stated principle. Even the 
National Research Council of the United States has submitted that “[g]reenhouse gases are 
accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air 
temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise.”147  Even if, as the United States 
government contends, anthropogenic climate change is not absolute science, the precautionary 
principle can easily overcome this defense.   
3. Significant Injury 
Finally, Tuvalu must prove that they, as a nation or as individuals within the nation, have 
suffered “significant injury” within the meaning of the Restatement §601.  As above, “significant 
injury” cannot mean minimal damage.148  Granted, the entire argument this thesis is based on 
deals with the threat of harm that Tuvalu may face in the near future and the amount of damages 
are growing daily.149  Much of this thesis has already discussed the possibility of severe 
significant harm that is predicted in Tuvalu’s relatively near future.  These predictions, such as 
the loss of an entire nation, though not concrete, reasonably pose a threat of substantial harm 
and, under Restatement §601, must therefore not be allowed to occur by the violating state.  
Regardless of whether or not an international tribunal would allow evidence of possible future 
injury, the current injury alone, such as frequent flooding, increased storm surges, erosion of a 
small nation with little ability to lose coastline, and increased salinity of groundwater affecting 
the growing of traditional crops, must constitute and embody what is legally defined as 
“significant injury.”  In either event, when discussing significant harm, the fact that a nation may 
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soon be engulfed by the sea and that fact that inhabitants have already began to take refuge 
within other nations must be taken into account when determining whether significant injury has 
in fact occurred.    
B. Human Rights Law 
 
We next must turn to the application of human rights law to the case of Tuvalu.  This 
application will be generally straight forward and, as such, does not need much elaboration other 
than emphasis on the of application to Tuvalu’s case.  In this regard, guidance can be found from 
the recent application of the Inuit indigenous people of North to the Organization of American 
States (OAS).150  Currently, these same basic human rights are the foundation for a suit within 
the OAS against the United States as the world’s largest producer of GHGs.151  The Inuit peoples 
are threatened with similar harm as Tuvalu, losing homeland and culture.  Because of its recent 
inception, no decision has been rendered in this case, but any outcome in the OAS case can 
clearly provide an example of arguments Tuvalu can make and also give foresight into the 
viability of such arguments.   
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
 
To scratch the surface, we will begin with the right to liberty and security of person.152  
Given the impending doom to the Tuvaluan people caused by the rise in the sea level and 
increase in storm intensity, personal security and personal liberty cannot exist.  Tuvaluan citizens 
only wishing to live out their days within their homeland can hardly embrace personal security 
when the sea is creeping over their borders, making their homeland not only smaller but more 
susceptible to storms and waves.  Even as environmental refugees in New Zealand, Tuvaluan’s 
can have no personal security or liberty.153  The right to liberty of movement and freedom to 
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choose one’s own residence including the right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
one’s home has also been violated where individuals wishing to live where they and their 
ancestors have for years are forced to flee.154   
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
Through this Covenant, the United States is obligated to refrain from acts that defeat the 
object and purpose of the following rights: the right the right to work,155 the right to adequate 
standards of living including adequate food and housing,156 the right to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental heath,157 and the right to take part in cultural life.158  Yet these 
rights are insidiously being violated daily by the slow form of terrorism known as global 
warming.  How can one enjoy their inherent right to when a nation that as relied economically on 
fishing for generations is now threatened by coral reef bleaching?  Adequate standards of living 
and adequate housing are unobtainable rights when constant flooding threatens existence much 
less comfortable living in one’s own home.  In this regard, an argument toward intergenerational 
rights, intergenerational equality, and the necessity of protecting both the present and future of 
the environment can also be made whereas instead of focusing on the aforementioned rights as 
applicable today, these rights would be applied to future generations whose lives will be 
impacted to an unimaginable extent by global warming.159      
VI. Remedies for Violation of Environmental Obligations:  What can Tuvalu request? 
 
Given the lack of definitive damages to future generations, a difficult argument still must 
be made by Tuvalu in order to seek damages against the United States for GHG emissions.   The 
Restatement section § 602 contains a provision relating to the remedies available to an injured 
state.160  If a state is found liable to another state for environmental damage, the injured state 
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may request prevention, reduction, or termination of the activity that poses a threat or an injury 
to the nation.161  The injured state may also receive reparations for damage caused by the 
perpetrating nation.”162  For ease of discussion, this section will be separated into the different 
remedies that Tuvalu could seek against the United States. 
A. Monetary Damages and the Problems with Apportionment 
 
With regard to damages that Tuvalu can seek against the United States, the problems of 
proof and causation stand may stand as daunting obstacles.  “[B]oth assessing prospective 
damages from global warming and apportioning the extent to which they are attributable to the 
United States would not be easy.”163  Yet given the ever increasing science on the subject such 
proof is entirely possible.  Assuming that Tuvalu could obtain the proper jurisdiction to hold the 
United States liable for its emissions there are several important issues to keep in mind.  Though 
the entire world has continued to release greenhouse gases into the air, the United States 
continues as the largest producer of these emissions.  As such, a state can only be held liable for 
the injury caused as a result of its own activity.164  This would mean an apportionment to the 
United States for nearly one-quarter (1/4) of the GHG emissions they spew into the air every 
year, and as analogous to comparative liability in domestic tort cases, the United States may only 
be held liable for one-quarter (1/4) of Tuvalu’s damages.  This idea is backed by the Restatement 
§602 that states: “[w]here more than one state contributes to the pollution causing significant 
injury, the liability will be apportioned among the states, taking into account, where appropriate, 
the contribution to the injury of the injured state itself.”165  In this regard, when dealing with 
potential damages constituting the entire loss of a nation, even a portion of liability could be 
staggering in relative terms.  Furthermore, the backlash of such a suit could have interesting 
consequences and though a favorable judgment for Tuvalu may not ultimately be punitive to the 
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United States, it may open Pandora’s Box when dealing with environmental litigation and be 
used as an eye opener for the United States to realize their destructive activities across the world 
will no longer go unheeded.  
Additional to not being liable for all damage caused, certain difficulties will also 
inevitably arise when trying to calculate non-economic damages to a nation.  Granted, the loss of 
homes and specific property within the state may have specific monetary value.  The problem 
arises when attempting to calculate the intangibles such as the loss of a heritage that has existed 
on this island for nearly two millennia.166  This problem also arises when dealing with the 
prospective future damages Tuvalu may have as a result of global warming.  As a definitive class 
of future individuals affected by global warming cannot be readily ascertained, it is unlikely such 
prospective damages can be awarded.167 
Difficulty also arises in calculation of liability when taking into account that 
“[a]nthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases have occurred since the time humans discovered 
fire, and particularly since the beginning of the industrial age.”168  As such, apportionment of 
liability may again prove arduous.  Monetary damages, however, may not be the most suitable 
relief requested for the case at bar.  Money cannot compensate a person whose entire life must be 
uprooted as their nation is being engulfed by the sea.  As such, focusing on abatement of 
continued greenhouse gas emission, though perhaps not the panacea for Tuvalu itself, may save 
other nations whose fate may be less clear.  
B. Forced compliance with international obligations 
 
As a main goal of bringing a suit against the United States would not be solely damages 
but also bringing the harms and disastrous effects of global warming into international spotlight, 
any international attention in this matter can be deemed progress.  However, another option for 
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Tuvalu would be to seek United States compliance in reducing emissions as set forth in 
international obligations and as suggested in the Restatement and International Human Rights 
Laws.  Given that the United States is not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol and because the 
UNFCCC does not provide “binding limits on emissions, . . .[but] generally provide[s] that . . . 
parties take measures that limit their GHG emissions” it will be difficult for any substantive 
changes to be made.169   Pursuant to the principles of state sovereignty, no jurisdiction sought by 
Tuvalu could force domestic legislation upon the United States.  However, one such international 
requirement imposed upon the United States is set forth in article 4(4) of the UNFCCC wherein 
developed parties such as the United States are obligated to “assist the developing country parties 
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs of 
adaptation to those adverse effects.”170  Though the science does not appear to show Tuvalu 
being able to adapt to the global warming phenomenon, foreign aid to care for the people, trying 
to determine ways to adapt, and the resulting international attention could be beneficial for the 
country. 
C. Injunction 
 
Another option, though not every viable, is the option of an injunction to put an end to 
the harm that is currently being perpetrated on this nation.  The problem lies, however, in both 
the authority to force such an abatement of transboundary pollution and the ability of the United 
States to end such practices.  Granted, the harm caused on the nation of Tuvalu is predicted to be 
unprecedented and horrific.  However, if a court of competent jurisdiction were found, it cannot 
simply force the United States to end all GHG producing industries.  Such action is not only 
impractical, it would also have an economic crippling effect on the United States and, therefore, 
such injunction could never be instituted. 
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VII. Conclusion:  Practicality 
[T]he sea-level inhabitants of Oceana and other low-lying lands, are surrogates 
for all of humanity.  Save them, and developed nations ultimately save 
themselves and many features of life as presently known on the planet.  
-Henry McGee in A New Legal Frontier in the fight against Global Warming 171 
 
One of the main obstacles that small developing Island Nations such as Tuvalu may face 
is its size, not only in regard to its ability to compensate for future climate changes but also in 
regard to public policy and international relations.  In all practicality, should the powerful United 
States be confronted by Tuvalu demanding reforms within the developed state itself, contempt 
may be the only emotion those within the developed nation feel, not compassion.  Further, if a 
lawsuit is brought against the United States it is inevitable, as it has been attempted in the past, 
that the United States will undoubtedly be hostile to giving up its sovereignty and will not allow 
damages to be forced upon them.172   In fact, to a superpower such as the United States, the 
thought that the nation of Tuvalu, with a population of around 10,000 constituting only 10 square 
miles of land mass, could impact much less control United States domestic policy would be 
enraging.  However, the probative value of such a suit based on the aforementioned legal 
arguments coupled with the current political climate and the beginning of mainstream acceptance 
of global warming could possibly show that any action on the part of Tuvalu may bring hope to 
their plight. 
 Clearly, international attention needs to be brought to the global warming phenomenon 
and the devastating effects upon nations such as Tuvalu.  The world must wake up to the plight 
of these nations as their fate will necessarily be the fate of the world.  Any international attention 
and any attempt to hold the United States liable for its GHG emissions will likely have the 
comparatively miniscule effect of shinning an international spotlight on the issues while 
internationally embarrassing the United States in its hubris.  While not the best outcome for 
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Tuvalu, this spotlight could prove the beginning of a monumental domestic change in United 
States and global policy that must occur for the ultimate salvation of our existence. 
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